The paper addresses how the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO) is attempting to mobilize the support of the Muslim communities in their counterterrorism strategy, together with their measures to prevent radicalisation processes among Muslim young people. Under what circumstances can we find voluntary cooperation by Muslim Swedes in the state's anti-terror policing efforts and under what circumstances can we expect that voluntary cooperation will be withheld? The analysis focuses two intertwined factors which I argue influence voluntary cooperation: the potential unintended consequences of the Security Service's outreach activities and the link between cooperation, institutional legitimacy and procedural justice. It is argued that both the 'soft' and 'hard' aspects of the Swedish Security Service's preventive, respective control and intelligence strategies, interconnect to produce unanticipated and unwanted consequences. The Swedish Security Service's outreach programme can have the unintended consequence that instead of counteracting radicalization processes, the programme, which targets practicing Muslims as per definition potential terrorists, can very well lead to radicalization among young Muslims with experiences of misrecognition.
maintain that however sophisticated government homeland security is, with even a high level of competence in counterterrorism strategies and tactics at the level of the local police, "the best plans and strategies will only be effective if they are carried out in active partnership with the community". Nevertheless, they point out that while countless studies have been conducted on the policing of terrorism in recent years, "we know little about how the police mobilize communities to cooperate with them in order to prevent acts of terrorism" (Ibid) Sweden has adopted an antiterror programme that more or less contains the same components as the United Kingdom's CONTEST programme. Similarly, the Swedish programme gives priority to the prevent strategy, that is, the aim to prevent recruitment into terrorist activities. However, in contrast with the UK counterterror strategy (Poynting and Mason 2006) , Sweden has never singled out Muslim extremism, but has always included leftwing and particularly rightwing extremism. Nevertheless, in regards to their measures to counterterrorism strategy to prevent radicalisation processes among Muslim young people, and in stark *Address corresponding to this author at the Department of Sociology, Box 720, University of Gothenburg, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden; Tel: +46 (0)31-773 4793; Fax: +46 (0)31-773 4764; E-mail: abby.peterson@sociology.gu.se contrast with measures to counter leftwing and rightwing extremism, the Swedish Security Service is targeting faith communities, i.e. practicing Muslims living in Sweden. By casting a wide net in their counterterrorism measures, the Service has introduced a 'religious profiling', which in effect risks criminalizing Muslims per se.
In order to address the research question posed in this article I analyse the inherent contradictions imposed in the 'soft aspects' of the Swedish Security Service's "outreach activities" to introduce a dialogue with Muslim communities and the Service's undeniable bread and butter mandate-surveillance and control. This analysis focuses two intertwined factors which I argue influence voluntary cooperation: the potential unintended consequences of the Security Service's outreach activities and the link between cooperation, institutional legitimacy and procedural justice. I will first interrogate the 'soft aspects' of the Swedish Security Service's outreach activities in conjunction with their potential unintentional negative consequences for Muslim Swedes' voluntary cooperation in the state's counterterrorism programme before turning to the Service's 'hard aspects' of surveillance and control, which can hypothetically undermine the trust and perceived legitimacy of the Service, also leading to non-cooperation. It is argued that both the 'soft' and 'hard' aspects of the Swedish Security Service's preventive, respective control and intelligence strategies, intertwine to produce what Lasse Lindekilde (2012) calls "iatrognic effects", that is, unanticipated and unwanted consequences. The empirical scope of the study only allows for analytical conclusions, which point towards (tentative) causal relations between the Service's outreach activities and potential noncooperation.
THE SWEDISH STATE'S COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAMME
In 2010 the Government commissioned the Swedish Security Service to author a report describing violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden, the radicalisation processes discernible in violencepromoting Islamist circles in Sweden and the tools and strategies that can be used to counter radicalisation (Violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden, 2010) . In this report they conclude that violencepromoting Islamist extremism exists in Sweden and constitutes a potential threat. They claim to have identified just under 200 individuals, mostly men, domiciled in Sweden who have participated in or supported violence-promoting Islamist extremism in 2009 or later. Within this larger group they have isolated a much smaller group of individuals, which they contend have the intent and capability to carry out a terrorist action, in most cases abroad. Subsequently, the report emphasizes that these phenomena are at this time limited and should mainly be addressed with more focus on preventive measures to stop them becoming a major problem for Swedish society. While the report highlights efforts to facilitate so called deradicalisation, such as activities to help those leaving extremist circles 1 , they regard this strategy as a complement to the main strategy of prevention. The authors argue that de-radicalisation may risk having the opposite effect by instead driving forward radicalisation and that prevention instead of trying to de-radicalize active individuals is more resource-effective (p. 93).
Sweden has drawn up a national strategy to address the threat from terrorism (Government Communication 2007/08: 64) and like the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and neighbouring Denmark, Sweden in 2011 has also adopted a national strategy to counter the phenomenon of extremism or radicalisation (Handlingsplan för att värna demokratin mot våldsbejakande extremism. Regeringens skrivelse The measure is comparable to the British "Channel" initiative which works at the local level with small numbers of "at risk" young people identified through multi-agency partnerships, which utilises a de-radicalisation approach (Thomas 2010: 450) . In Sweden it is not the Security Service that carries out deradicalisation initiatives, rather the National Board for Youth Affairs has been commissioned to help young people leave groups that promote political violence. In Sweden this de-radicalistion approach has only been implemented in conjunction with rightwing extremist youth. 2011/12:44;) . The national strategy emphasizes prevention measures that above all are intended to strengthen democratic attitudes among marginalized groups perceived as posing a threat, above all young people in depressed neighbourhoods. The greater part of the concrete measures listed in the report has been consigned to the Bureau of Youth Affairs to distribute various project funds, together with the Council of Faith Societies to distribute democracy promoting educational projects to de facto Muslim congregations. In regard to the measures directed towards the Swedish Muslim population, the report describes what is perceived as the problem by relying on what has become a prevailing discourse of radicalization and theories of radicalization processes focusing issues of lack of integration, parallel communities, and antiliberal attitudes among Muslim minorities understood as providing a "breeding ground" for radicalization (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; Sedgwick 2010 ).
In the national strategy to counter violencepromoting extremism the role of the Swedish Security Service is awarded one short paragraph, emphasizing the National Strategy to Counter Terrorism (skr. 2007/08:64) . In this strategy programme the Swedish Security Service bears the responsibility to:
• Prevent recruitment into terrorism
• Avert threats from existing players
•

Protect from terrorism
This is more or less identical to the programme declaration of the Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Council, which the Service took the initiative to create in 2005. The Council is a collaboration of 14 Swedish government agencies 2 to address the threat of terrorism. The Security Service acts as the Council's convenor and the Council's aims are to improve the participating agencies' collective ability to "handle the consequences of a terrorist attack (p. 77), in addition to the three aims listed above 3 .
The first aim stressed in the report appears to form the strategic backbone of the State's counterterrorism programme-de facto formulated by the Swedish Security Service.
THE STUDY'S METHODOLOGY
In order to acquire an understanding as to how Muslim communities perceive the Swedish Security Service's counterterror prevention strategy the study is built upon multiple empirical sources. Imad Rasan, a doctoral student at the Department of Sociology, University of Lund, conducted interviews with representatives from four Muslim umbrella organisations (five interviews; all in Stockholm) and interviews with members from five different Muslim faith communities, i.e. Mosques in Gothenburg. The author conducted interviews with three members from Muslim faith communities in Gothenburg. The thirteen interviews included interviews with twelve men between the age of twenty-one and thirty-five and one woman in her fifties. The respondents were asked if and how the Security Service had approached them; how they had interpreted the 'dialogue' sought by the Service; and lastly, they were asked to more generally reflect on the Service's actions towards Muslims. As the study was perceived sensitive the respondents were assured anonymity and subsequently they, and their organisations or Mosques, are not identified in the text. The interviews were recorded when permitted and transcribed or careful notes were taken during the interview, which were later transcribed.
Most of the respondents in our study referred to specific actions taken against Muslims in Gothenburg, which they perceived were initiated and conducted by the Security Service. Subsequently, the study includes germane newspaper articles, which were supplemented by relevant websites and blogs, which provided statements by official spokesmen for some of the Muslim communities that our respondents were members of. As none of our respondents were directly involved in these actions that garnered extensive media attention, these sources provide the backdrop from which our respondents constructed their narratives. Lastly, we have taken into account the report Violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden (2010) , which is the only official document that describes and explains the Security Service's strategy to prevent radicalisation processes among Muslim young people.
NEW GOVERNANCE SPACES OPENED BY THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE
The Swedish State's counterterrorism programme stresses the importance of prevention and the idea: is to make it more difficult for people who are already violence-promoting to attract new supporters, and to make fewer people receptive to and attracted by violencepromoting ideologies (Violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden, 2010: 78) .
To meet this aim the Security Service has since 2003 conducted what they call outreach activities. The objective of the outreach activities is to establish direct contacts with actors strategically important on the local level, such as community police, city district councils and civil society associations. In particular the Service seeks to establish contact with and create good relationships with Sweden's practicing Muslims. The outreach activities of the Security Service are an attempt to create new spaces of governance, where Muslim communities (and individuals) are 'invited' to participate in the State's counterterrorism programme. These "invited spaces" (Cornwall 2004 ) reflect what Raco (2003: 78) describes as the State's "increased concern with defining and shaping 'appropriate' individual and community conduct, regulation and control". According to Rose (1999) , communities, and I would argue in Sweden especially Muslim communities, have become zones to be probed, mapped, classified, documented and accounted for. I argue that the Security Service's outreach activities are the means by which Muslim communities are investigated and mapped through intelligence gathering and by which the Service in the long-term strives to shape the values and conduct of Swedish Muslims in general.
The initial outreach activities were conducted on a small scale, first making contact with Muslim umbrella organisations and national organisations. According to the Security Service since then regular meetings have taken place with both national organisations and local congregations in Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmö, Umeå, Uppsala and Örebro to achieve a dialogue with Muslim communities. The service acknowledges that cooperation established with Muslim communities is fundamental for their efforts.
Through a long-term effort to build trust and relationships with representatives of Muslim organisations, the Security Service hopes to create a climate where radicalisation and violence-promoting extremism can be prevented through cooperation (Violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden, 2010: 78).
What we found in our study is that the representatives of various Muslim congregations in Gothenburg and Stockholm we interviewed denied formal contact with the Swedish Security Service, but they did indicate that most likely other Muslim organisations than their own do have different forms of cooperation with the Security Service. A few conceded that the Security Service had approached them at their mosque and attempted to question them, but they emphasize that they are reluctant to engage in conversations.
They have tried to contact us and have come here (to the mosque), just like other police or other state institutions. Some police officers come here and record Friday sermons and prayer. However, we did not cooperate with the Security Service, even if they come here and try to discuss with us.
The report does not offer the reader a picture as to how these so-called outreach meetings are conducted nor how Muslim organisations have responded to these initiatives. We are only informed that their contacts with Muslim communities are good, which is not, however, unequivocally reflected in our study. In contrast our study indicates that the outreach activities have been imposed against a background of widespread mistrust. One respondent said that the Security Service officers were "very clever when listening to us, for example, they asked us if we have any problems. They tended to answer us and listen to our criticisms". Another clue as to how these outreach meetings are conducted is revealed in an interview with a young man that had been called to a "dialogue" in early 2009 with two Security Service officers.
They asked me what we do when we meet, what we talk about, what I do in my leisure time, what I think about jihad and whether I would consider whether I would call them if one of my students planned to travel to Iraq. … The Security Service thinks that we are all potential terrorists and suicide bombers just because we practice our religion.
We found that the outreach activities designed to initiate a dialogue with Muslim communities are for the most part experienced rather as occasions where many have felt that they have been interrogated.
The report states that the outreach activities give the Security Service the opportunity to exchange information and contribute to answering questions thereby avoiding misunderstandings. However, given that the Swedish Security Service is the least transparent of all of Sweden's governmental agencies with respect to the principle of secrecy applying to their on-going and past investigations, it is difficult to envision how and to what extent the Service can reciprocally exchange knowledge or the degree to which they can answer concrete questions. In other words, the quality of the dialogue achieved is debatable. A respondent stated that the so-called dialogues were not in fact dialogues. "It is rather two parts who need to talk and cooperate around certain issues". However, how trust can be realized given this institutional situation is not discussed in the report.
The only organisational representatives that admit that they have regular contacts with the Security Service are those from umbrella organisations, which in itself is not controversial as these contacts are to be expected given Sweden's corporate structure and that these organisations have received governmental funding. In these cases officers from the Security Service book a time and come directly to their offices. According to most of our respondents, the resulting conversations are more or less directed to surveillance gathering.
They only want information from us … what do we know. Is there someone that we think is a potential extremist and so on. … I think that their outreach programme is good if they want to bridge the gap between the Security Service and Muslim communities, but if they only want to retrieve information and perceive me as a link to extremists this programme is going down the wrong path.
On the other hand, one of our respondents (from a national umbrella organisation) gave us another somewhat divergent picture as to how these meetings transpire.
The dialogue that takes place between the Security Service and Muslim organisations focus on everyday problems that these organisations face and the Security Service has tried to help Muslim organisations overcome these problems. In fact, the Security Service has helped Muslim organisations with different issues, among others, tenant cases, to invite guests from other countries, building permits, and so on. In other cases, the Security Service has attempted to speak with the immigration office in order to follow-up Muslim asylum seekers to help them. Muslim organisations think that in these cases the dialogue is excellent.
However, this respondent was sceptical as to whether the Security Service was the appropriate governmental agency to solve these integration issues.
Why not the Department of Integration or the National Youth Board? It is very good that someone from the State takes an interest in our problems, but why the Security Service? It is very strange that the Security Service deals with these kinds of issues. The question remains: what would the Security Service like to get back from us? Do they want information from us? … Moreover, the term "prevent activities" is very problematical because these activities regard Muslims as a problem and threat to society. That is why the government has commissioned the Security Service to start a dialogue with Muslims.
While the respondent above admits that the meetings with the Security Service have resulted in some benefits for Muslim communities, he is more or less critical to the fact that it is the Security Service that is opening up new spaces of governance, whereby the state is seeking to engage with Muslim communities to prevent processes of radicalization. In short, he is critical to the fact that it is the Security Service that has extended the 'invitation' to these invited spaces of governance and not more appropriate governmental agencies with integration agendas. So despite what he sees as some benefits that have been attained through their meetings with the Security Service, he appears to be convinced that the 'hidden agenda' is, in reality, intelligence gathering. Another respondent claimed that there is something inherently wrong "that the government uses the Security Service to initiate a dialogue with Muslims".
The respondents express a similar reservation to the Service's targeting of all Muslims with those Lindekilde (2012a and 2012b) found in Denmark and Thomas (2010: 448) found in the UK. The Swedish Security Service appears to have made the same mistake as the British Preventing Violent Extremism programme "approaching an entire faith community as a whole, while forcing particular political and doctrinal issues that have only limited meaning to most Muslims going about their ordinary, day-to-day lives". The Service's outreach activities subsequently tend to engage Swedish Muslims as an 'at risk' set of communities.
It would appear that Muslim representatives perceive the outreach programme as more or less a 'one-way dialogue' 4 where the sole objective of the contacts is to gather intelligence and not to bridge the gap between the Security Service and Muslim communities.
I am very disappointed with the Security Service because they place all of their resources in controlling Muslim extremists and forget that there are other forms of extremism that are coming from right wing groups and left autonomous groups. These groups pose a danger for democracy in Sweden and when I see that democracy in Sweden is threatened I am disappointed. … I would appreciate it if the Security Service took their responsibility and dealt with extremism across the board, and not only Muslim extremists. We feel that we are constantly under threat, particularly when we receive threatening mail at our office. Extremists have searched after my home address and sent me threatening mail. I would appreciate it if the Security Service took these threats seriously. … As a Muslim I want to feel safe from racists and it is the Security Service's duty to protect me from these threats, just as they have to protect nonMuslims from fundamentalist groups.
Research has consistently found that ethnic minority groups feel that as victims of crime, they are not taken seriously and the response by the police is often regarded as inadequate (e.g. Sharp and Atherton 2007; 4 Even the uniformed police in Sweden have complained about the 'one-way' nature of the Security Service's dialogue. The informants from the 'open police' authority in a study of inter-agency partnership in the anti-terror programme claimed that the Security Service demands information, but does not reciprocate with feedback (Ranstorp and Dos Santos 2009: 19) . Desmoyers-Davis 2003; Spencer and Hough 2000; ) . It would appear that the output of the outreach programme falls well short of its intentions. "In the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the prejudice that many Muslims then faced, and still face, the Security Service aims to show that it is there to serve everyone, as an obvious cooperation partner" (Violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden, 2010: 78; my emphasis;). If it is the Swedish Security Service's duty to serve and protect everyone this respondent is not convinced that the Service is fulfilling its duty.
In addition to meetings with representatives of Muslim interests in order to promote cooperation with Muslim communities in Sweden, according to the Security Service they have met as well with individual practising Muslims, particularly young men, much in line with the Danish Security and Intelligence Service's "preventive talks" (Lindekilde 2012 ). This was not discussed in the report and we only have the accounts of the young men who have been called to their offices. However, these 'meetings' would appear to be solely to secure information. What has been reported on Websites and blogs, together with interview confirmation in our study, is that the young men contacted feel that they have no option but to come to these 'meetings'. "If we don't agree to meet with them they will think that we are concealing something". This was the same interpretation that one of our respondents provided regarding the Security Service's "invitations" to meet for a discussion. "If you refuse to cooperate they will think that you have something to hide." Another respondent said that he, as a 'second generation' Swedish Muslim, can criticize them and argue with them "but the first generation men are very careful and they feel unsafe when talking with the Security Service. The old men feel that they are forced to talk to the Security Service". In other words, these invitations are perceived as a subtle form of coercion reminding us that in the "invited spaces" of governance it is the State, in this case, the Swedish Security Service, that defines 'the rules of the game' and sets the parameters of participation (cf. Taylor 2007: 302) .
By attempting to mobilize all Muslims, the failure of Muslim individuals or organisations to comply with this mobilization makes them suspect in the eyes of the counterterrorist system (cf. Akram and Johnson 2002; Kundani 2009 : 15 regarding UK). But as Kundani points out, Muslims may very well avoid a Security Service's invitation to cooperate for a number of reasons that have nothing to do with support for violent terrorist tactics. I would argue that the reluctance of Muslim communities to engage with the Swedish Security Service is a form of community resistance to cooptation and colonialisation in order to maintain their credibility and legitimacy with their congregations. Even if many of the informants in our study tended to regard the Service's 'invitations' as more or less mandatory to comply with, they are not forced to enter these new governance spaces with full cooperation. Morison (2000: 131) argues that there are always some organisations and communities that remain "incompletely domesticated". Many of the representatives of the Muslim communities we interviewed bear witness to tactics of non-compliance with the Swedish Security Service that can be interpreted as a form of resistance to cooptation and colonialisation. They either refuse to talk to officials from the Service or refuse to provide them with information. For example, one young man who was interviewed claimed that Security Service showed him pictures of other politically or religiously active Muslims and asked him if he could identify them. He reported that he did recognize all of the men but denied that he knew them. In short, he complied to meet with the Security Service, but he actively withheld information. Another strategy expressed by a representative from an umbrella organisation was to meet with the Security Service collectively. "If the Security Service wants to meet with Muslim organisations, then we are seven organisations in one appointment". In this way they tried to infuse the 'dialogues' with the Security Service with a degree of transparency for the congregations they represent. They were extremely reluctant to meet with officers from the Security Service alone.
Sweden's policy of multiculturalism has traditionally engaged with the country's immigrant and refugee population in terms of ethnic background, that is, the state on local and national levels has encouraged and supported ethnic minority organisations and teaching in mother tongue languages. The multicultural model seeks to support cultural difference and awards ethnic minorities specified cultural rights. Immigrant organisations were more or less organisations that encouraged and protected the cultural identity of ethnic groups in Swedish society (Dahlström 2007) . However, integration policy has more and more gone beyond ethnicity to focus religiosity. Since the latter 1990s the Swedish State has increasingly sought multiethnic partnerships with so called faith communities. Dinham and Lowndes (2008: 824) argue that within public discourse in Britain only Muslims have faith, "and a potentially dangerous faith at that". This current in public discourse appears in Sweden as well, where faith is discursively constructed as a property of the "Other". Partnerships have been sought with the various Muslim communities in the country, which are perceived in general as vulnerable to persuasion to support terrorism. In our study this targeting of Muslim faith communities appears to have led to a widespread sense of victimization (see Lindekilde 2012a and 2012b for similar conclusions from his Danish study;).
When the suicide bomb attack was carried out last year on Drottninggatan, it seems that the Security Service's procedures were completely unacceptable. After the assault their terrorist expert Magnus Ranstorp referred in the media to Muslims as suspected to lie behind the attack. I was very angry because they pointed their finger at all Muslims, stereotyping Muslims as everything wrong in society. We as Muslims are also exposed to threats just like everyone else. We did not receive a SMS to vacate the street because we are Muslims. It was not only a threat to Swedes, it was also a threat to Muslims and democracy. When the terrorist attack took place in Norway Magnus Ranstorp was quick to once again point his finger at Muslims as suspects behind this attack. (respondent from an umbrella organisation)
The Swedish Security Service's attempt to mobilize all Muslims is a form of religious profiling that, in effect, constructs Muslims into a suspect community, a criminal threatening Other. In Lindekilde's (2012b: 17) study, the majority of Muslims they interviewed perceived the Danish radicalization policies, which they felt targeted all practicing Muslims in general, as a misrecognition of their value as citizens. In short, the Danish Muslims in their study felt that the Danish action plan stigmatized all Muslims as potential terrorists. Their conclusions dovetail with those we reached in our Swedish study. Ahmed Al-Mofty, who is the President of the Islamic Information Association and the foundation behind the new mosque in Gothenburg, claims that he does not want to have anything to do with the Security Service.
They are so unprofessional. Their actions do not further or fit in with a democratic society. People feel harassed, they accuse people without supporting evidence and say that they have facts that they don't. We Muslims feel accused all the time as if we were criminals. (http:/www.gp.se/nyheter/goteborg/1.7255 39-garna-polisen-inte-sapo) Waddington (1999: 41) argues that the "police patrol the boundaries of citizenship: the citizenship of those who are 'respectable' is secured, while those who attack the state exclude themselves from citizenship". Between these polar extremes we find a grey zone wherein those whose claim to citizenship is insecure and needs repeatedly to be negotiated. Following this line of thought contact with Swedish Security Service officers inherently challenges claims to citizenship, of being valued members in the broader society. Contacts with the Swedish Security Service officers, can either be interpreted as communicating that one is a valued member of the community and that one's group, sic Muslims, are valued in Swedish society or not. Encounters with the Security Service can at best confirm the individual's social standing and his or her group's social standing, but there are many possibilities that the encounter will undermine the status of the contacted individual resulting in resentment as witnessed in the narrative above.
While the report highlights prevention, emphasising integration strategies, a soft security agenda, this agenda has inherent contradictions with the counterterrorism programme's aims to overt threats from existing players and to protect from terrorism, classical hard security agendas based on surveillance and control. The critics of the British Prevent programme point out that Muslim communities with whom the government has sought to engage were suspicious of an engagement plan that was seen as entrenched in the surveillance and police control of Muslim populations more generally (Kundnani 2009; Thomas 2010) . The two logics of engagement would appear to be at odds. On the one hand the Swedish Security Service, like its counterpart in Britain, seeks to engage with Muslim communities as a resource in the national and local state's integration efforts, on the other hand the Security Service is operationally driven by a surveillance and risk logic. While the Security Service invited Muslim stakeholders to participate in a workshop that provided valuable insight and input to their report Violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden (2010: 78) , this is an unusual mode of information gathering. Furthermore, we do not know to what extent that the concluding reflections in the report actually impact the operationalisation of the Counterterrorism Programme. The logic of perceiving Muslim groups as civil society representatives and stakeholders is by all accounts new for the Swedish Security Service and we have little evidence that this logic is not superseded by its stronger and traditional risk logic of surveillance and control, leading to an engagement with Muslims as suspects rather than citizens (cf. Birt 2009 regarding the UK).
The role of initiator for a radicalization prevention strategy hinging on integration and anti-discrimination measures, which was pushed upon the Security Service by politicians, is in itself an anomaly given its traditional role of providing intelligence and security. Not unpredictably, the representatives of the Muslim communities that we interviewed were sceptical to the appropriateness of the Security Service's soft approach: "Why not the Department of Integration or the National Youth Board?". Rather they thought that the approach was a ruse for its dominant logic of surveillance and police control: "Do they want information from us?".
RECIPROCAL TRUST AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Researchers and practitioners alike have emphasized the importance of police-community relations based on reciprocal trust for police-community cooperation. This holds true not only for policing in general, but also for counterterrorism or 'high-policing' in particular. As Oliver (2006: 192) points out, citizens' willingness to provide information on terrorism to the police can in no way be taken for granted, as such contact between the police and the community demands a significant degree of reciprocal trust.
When the public perceives police actions as legitimate and fostering procedural justice, i.e. due process of law and fairness to all, there is an increase in general satisfaction and cooperation (Hough and Roberts 2004; Tyler 2006; Skogan 2006; Skogan and Frydl 2004; Bradford et al. 2009; Jackson and Sunshine 2007; Jackson and Bradford 2009; Sindall et al. 2012; ) . The effectiveness of the state's proactive counterterrorism measures-intelligence gathering, surveillance and preventive programmes-rests upon the degree to which relevant populations have developed sufficient trust and confidence in the police, both state and local (cf. Lyons 1999) .
Then, what are the policing strategies, which enhance, alternative diminish, public cooperation? Tyler (2006) distinguishes between two mechanisms by which policing can reduce levels of social disorder: the instrumental and the normative. In the former model of social control individuals calculate the expected costs and benefits from compliance with the law or cooperation with the police. They comply or cooperate only when the benefits outweigh the costs. The alternative model emphasizes self-regulatory, normative motivations for compliance and cooperation. People comply and cooperate when they believe that authorities are legitimate and entitled to be obeyed. The research of Tyler among others has established a robust link between cooperation, institutional legitimacy and the concept of procedural justice, i.e. the fairness of police procedures.
The fairness of police procedures depends, for example, on the manner in which street stops are conducted, whether the police are neutral and transparent in their application of legal rules, whether they explain their actions and seek input from community members before making decisions, and whether they treat people with dignity and respect. Judgements about procedural justice have been found to influence the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement and thus to affect willingness to comply and to cooperate (Tyler, Schulhofer and Huq 2010: 367) .
The self-regulatory normative model has been widely supported in studies of policing ordinary crime. Whether this model applies as well to anti-terror policing is the question posed by Tyler, Schulhofer and Huq (2010) . They tested the relative significance of the normative model in the context of antiterrorism policing within domestic U.S. Muslim communities contrasting deterrence and legitimacy as rival explanations for cooperation. These researchers found a strong correlation between perceptions of procedural justice and both perceived legitimacy and willingness to cooperate among Muslim American communities in the context of antiterrorism policing. Furthermore they found that religiosity, cultural differences, and political background have at best weak connections with cooperation. Subsequently, they argue that procedural justice considerations must be infused in the design of antiterrorism policing strategies concerning Muslim Americans in the U.S.
The study finds that the procedural justice of the police when implementing antiterror policing policies shapes their legitimacy and also influences both general cooperation and willingness to contact and alert law enforcement to terror threats (p. 386).
A respondent in our study defined his relationship with the Security Service in the following words:
We feel offended when the Security Service says that we want to cooperate with you and we want to improve our relations with you and at the same time they take offensive actions against Muslims in a mosque in Gothenburg and point their weapons against children there. There is systematic discrimination against Muslims when the Security Service deals solely with Muslim extremism and not nonMuslim extremism.
A legitimacy-based model of policing suggests that the public evaluates police, courts, and the law primarily in terms of how authority is exercised (Tyler 2006) . In the following pages we will counter pose the empirical examples of the actions of the Swedish Security Service, in cooperation with the regional police authority, in connection with the apprehension and arrest of suspected Muslim terrorists in Gothenburg with elements in the concept of procedural justice. Procedural justice has two elements: the quality of the process used to make decisions, and the quality of the interpersonal treatment people receive when dealing with authorities. Spalek et al. (2008) have found that the 'hard' anti-terror policing approaches used in the UK, including intensified stop and search, high profile raids leading to non-convictions, and the perception of an escalation in aggressive attempts at recruiting informers, are "creating barriers to good policecommunity relations and subsequent partnership" (p. 9). These approaches have led to breaches in the quality of procedural justice encountered by Muslim communities in the UK and, according to Spalek et al. (2008) , has helped to create a sense of grievance and feelings that they are "suspect communities". Can we find similar elements in the Swedish Security Service's 'hard' policing approaches, which can be expected to likewise undermine the intentions of their soft security prevention programme?
December 11, 2010 in Stockholm witnessed the only Muslim terrorist action, which has taken place in Sweden; an aborted suicide bombing which caused the death of the Swedish Muslim bomber but did not result in further deaths or injuries among the people shopping in the street at the time. The man had reported the motive for his action to be influenced by the artist Lars Vilks' drawings of the Prophet Mohammad as a so called traffic roundabout dog. Since the inception of the 2003:148 Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Offences, 40 individuals have been placed under arrest, few have been brought to trial and only two have resulted in convictions (at the time of writing). In the following paragraphs I will briefly account for some of the more spectacular raids against suspected Muslim terrorists in West Gotalands Police District.
On October 30, 2010 in the early morning hours three families were brought in for questioning by the national swat team, which were heavily armed. The doors of their homes were broken down and the families held under gunpoint, including three children. Three men were subsequently detained for further questioning in regards to suspicion of preparation of a terrorist bombing against the city's major shopping mall. The men were shortly after released from questioning and after ten days all charges were dropped. It was later revealed that the warrant for their arrest was decided by the special prosecutor for terrorist offences, without him having read the witness interrogations, whom he had nonetheless described as highly credible. The witness, a thirty-year-old woman with a limited comprehension of Arabic, had heard a very tall African man scream into a mobile telephone about a bomb in the mall. The single witness in a later interrogation retracted her statement, now claiming that the man was neither tall nor African. One of the suspects admitted to talking in a mobile about his 'exploding headache', which was an expression used in a highly televised commercial for a headache preparation highlighting an ethnic minority man describing the pain in his head. (Göteborgs-Posten, 2011.12.16, p. 17) The men, with backgrounds in Syria, were afforded an informal apology by the District's police chief Ingemar Johansson. While Johansson expressed his regrets over the mistake, he was reported to have explained to the men that as they came from countries and cultures where terrorism was common they could not be expected to be treated like an ordinary Swedish family from the countryside (http://www.aip.nu/default. aspx?page=3&nyhet=41484). In conjunction with this episode eight men were detained in a mosque for questioning and the mosque was searched, which contributed to further alienating the Muslim community.
Zana Muhammed, when he was active in Sweden's Young Muslims in the early 2000s, agreed to meet with Security Service officers. He thought that the meeting was a little exciting. They told him about their activities and which organisations were "dangerous". However:
I would never do that today. I have lost hope after how the Security Service has treated Muslims in Gothenburg. When they break into the homes of innocent families and point their automatic weapons at them in front of their wives and children. I don't trust them. What happened to those men last fall could just as well happen to me.
(http:/www.gp.se/nyheter/goteborg/ 1.725539-garna-polisen-inte-sapo) Omar Mustafa, the President of the Islamic Association, spoke in the same vein.
What happened in Gothenburg and Gårdsten's Mosque was a catastrophe. … At the same time that they initiate a dialogue they make these kinds of mistakes. They would have never entered a Christian church in this way. The biggest problem is that when they do something wrong they can't explain to us why. Many Muslim associations are tired of this. (http:/www.gp.se/nyheter/goteborg/1.7255 39-garna-polisen-inte-sapo) September 11 th 2011 four men were arrested in a high-profile raid for planning a terrorist attack on the Gothenburg arts centre Röda Sten-ten years after the 9/11 attacks. This was a raid which garnered global media attention. Originally the men were reported in the media to have planned a terrorist attack with automatic weapons and bombs. A few days later one of the men was released from custody, however, three of the men remained held in custody for several months and their detainment was shrouded by an unusual degree of secrecy. The special prosecutor released neither the charges nor the grounds for the charges to either the detained suspects' lawyers or the media.
First after a few weeks during the arraignment procedures the charges were dropped from preparation of a terrorist attack to preparation of murder. The three men were now charged with planning the murder of artist Lars Vilks with a knife and were retained in custody. Several months later when the men were finally put on trial the charges were then dropped against two of the men and one man was found guilty of carrying a concealed weapon-a pocket-knife-and fined. Obviously, this was again an embarrassing case for the Swedish Security Service and their anti-terror actions.
These are a few of the more high profile antiterrorist actions by the Swedish Security Service in Gothenburg, which arguably did not have procedural justice in the foreground. They appear to have alienated the Muslim communities we studied and the events were related in our respondents' narratives of what they felt were cases of unjust treatment. One or more of these actions were mentioned by all but three of the respondents in our study as examples of what they perceived as examples of unfair treatment by the Swedish Security Service. While their narratives did not necessarily provide accurate accounts, for example, the actions in reality were carried out by the Regional Police Authority, they all attributed what they regarded as unfair policing procedure to the Security Service. So while the Swedish Security Service is cognisant of the need to gain the support of Muslim communities in their counterterrorism efforts through improving policecommunity relations, we can witness an increasing alienation among Swedish Muslims in regards to the police. In Gothenburg, Sweden's second largest city with a large number of Muslim communities, a series of police and public prosecutor actions against Muslims suspected of terrorist activities has outraged a significant proportion of the Muslim population undermining the relations with the police, in particular the Swedish Security Service. Not only do actions such as these undermine the cooperation they seek in their outreach programme, research suggests that intrusive measures can potentially stimulate terrorist recruitment (Donohue 2008 ).
CONCLUSIONS Preconditions for Cooperation
As Murphy, Hinds and Fleming (2008) point out that while the police have the power to regulate people by applying or threatening to apply sanctions, their ability to control crime more effectively is significantly enhanced by increasing public cooperation. In their study they found that: a process-oriented strategy to policingwhich places procedural justice and trust in the foreground of encounters with the public -serves to build and maintain the legitimacy of police, which then makes it easier for them to encourage community cooperation (p. 140).
Their conclusions regarding police-community relations more generally dovetail with the findings of Tyler, Schulhofer and Huq (2010) who specifically studied how procedural justice impacts the effectivity of counterterrorism policing. In short, fair procedures practiced towards communities communicate to the group respect and value, while unfair procedures communicate disrespect and marginality. In our case the actions of Swedish Security Service-in conjunction with highly medialised detainments and arrests and in conjunction with the Service's outreach programme which is seen as veiled attempts to procure information and which is perceived to victimize all Muslim communities as suspects in Sweden's counterterrorism programme-has not placed procedural justice in the foreground. Procedural justice, during both policy formulation in Sweden's counterterrorism programme and in the implementation of its measures, shape the attitudes of Swedish Muslims towards cooperation or non-cooperation. If these communities do not perceive that they are viewed as valued members of society, sic "respectable citizens" (Waddington 1999: 41) , they cannot reasonably be expected to assist the Security Service in their counterterrorism efforts.
Furthermore, the Swedish Security Service's outreach programme's focus on Muslim communities may even be counterproductive because of the suspicions and mistrust that this approach tends to provoke among ordinary Muslims. Our informants described the outreach activities, the 'invitations to dialogue' initiated by the Security Service, as crudely veiled attempts to procure information and not as an attempt to establish a relation of trust and reciprocity. Comparable to the Danish action plan against radicalization, the Swedish Security Service's outreach programme can have the unintended consequence that young Muslims can "isolate from majority society and actively discredit authorities (Lindekilde 2012a: 26) . Instead of counteracting radicalization processes, the programme, which targets practicing Muslims as per definition potential terrorists, can very well lead to radicalization among young Muslims with experiences of misrecognition. Lindekilde (2012b) argues that when Muslims are targeted as a generalized potential threat and Muslims perceive policies as discriminatory and stigmatising, action plans against radicalization can result in both short and long run "backfire processes" that in turn lead to an acceleration of radicalization processes among many "home grown terrorists".
